In addition, the conditions of measurement differ for each proposer of countermeasure, and the verification of an appropriate measurement is not performed. Therefore, a third party cannot do a double check, and different countermeasures cannot be compared. In particular, these problems have not been researched from the viewpoint of information security. Problem P1 is part of the topic focusing on the electromagnetic measurement space. Therefore, details of P1 are not discussed in this paper. Kuhn shows a detailed analysis and constructive proposal to this problem in his paper at CHES 2005 [9] . We contribute to solve problem P2. In this paper, we describe a method for evaluating the effectiveness of the countermeasures from the viewpoint of information theory. We assume the space between the IT device and the receiver is a communication channel, and we define the amount of information leakage via electromagnetic emanations by its channel capacity. Using the value of channel capacity, we can calculate the amount of information per pixel in the reconstructed image. When the target is a monochrome image, if we can get 1.0[bit] per pixel or more, the image can be successfully reconstructed. If a reconstructed image has 0.0[bit] per pixel, it will be a perfectly random noise image. We show the experimental results of a comparison between the amount of information leakage and the quality of the reconstructed image. From these results, we conclude that if a countermeasure can archive the reconstructed image with about 0.8[bit] per pixel or less, it will be effective. Manuscript where S denotes the power of the signal, N denotes the power of the noise and W denotes the bandwidth.
We assume the space between the target and the receiver to be an additive Gaussian channel with bandwidth signal. Thus, we can estimate the amount of information leakage can be received as channel capacity. However, in this case, only the receiver exists, and the target does not generate a signal. We face the following problems. Q1. What is the signal? Q2. Which frequency should be received? Q3. How do we distinguish between signal and noise?
We discuss these problems.
Q1. What Is the Signal?
Since IT devices leak various kinds of processing information as electromagnetic emanations, eavesdroppers should decide which signal to receive [14], [18] . For a Tempest, the target signal is a video. The eavesdropper receives a video signal from the electromagnetic emanations and gives vertical and horizontal synchronization signals to make the image. As a precondition, the eavesdropper can give the same synchronization signal as the target, but this condition can be easily solved [3], [10], [15] , [20] . When the eavesdropper can see the reconstructed information as an image, we can judge that he or she has succeeded in receiving the signal. When the eavesdropper cannot make an image, he or she can be judged to have failed. In this way, especially for information concerning man-machine interfaces, we can easily judge success or failure because successfully reconstructed information can be easily recognized. Therefore we can distinguish signal from noise easily. We obtained the spectral analysis result shown in Fig. 3 (i) . The averaged noise level, N, is about 29.4[dBm] from the spectral analysis. The channel capacity, C, was calculated as follows.
In this experiment, because C is significantly larger than V, we expected a clear reconstructed image. To reconstruct displayed information, we set the bandwidth value of the receiver to 20[MHz] and set the center frequency to 360[MHz] and make the reconstructed image shown in Fig. 3 not generated from parts without causing horizontal changes in the image, such parts are not reflected in the reconstructed image. Though such lost data occurred, we were able to get enough semantics from the reconstructed image about the displayed information.
Analysis of Results
From the value of C, we estimated that Fig. 3 ( Many methods can be used to make Tempest fonts. In this paper, we evaluate the Gaussian method from the viewpoint of the value of Q [20]. The Gaussian method is a technique for smoothing images by using a Gauss filter. To use the Gauss function for the filter, the value is calculated according to the distance from the center pixel, (xa, yb), using the following formula. these images to make the legible order. All testees answered that R0 is the most legible at first. In the same way, they claimed that R1 is also clear image. Though it will be difficult to see in printed images, vertical lines of square in R2 was recognized easily by testees. And they noticed part of circle and hatched lines of triangle after a while. All testees answered that he or she cannot see anything in R3 and R4. Moreover, they could not distinguish R3 and R4 and allocate the order. These results are concluded in Table 2 . As the results, we expected that the countermeasure that archives Q<0.8 will be sufficiently effective for Fig. 2 .
After some experiments using other displayed images and using other generating methods of Tempest fonts, we concluded Q=0.8 will be the threshold value that we can determine effective countermeasure. However, we need more discussions about scheme of subjective test and we will need some psychological method such as affordance. We used an VAIO PCG-351N (SONY) as a target note type personal computer. Its measured synchronization frequency is as follows. 
